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LIFE AFTER ACT 10?: IS THERE A 
FUTURE FOR COLLECTIVE 
REPRESENTATION OF WISCONSIN 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES? 
MARTIN H. MALIN* 
In 2011, Wisconsin largely gutted the collective bargaining rights of 
most public employees in the state.  Wisconsin Act 10 largely replaced 
collective employee voice with unilateral employer control over 
employees’ wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment.  This 
article addresses the future of collective employee representation in 
Wisconsin in the wake of Act 10.  It urges employers to continue to 
engage with their employees through the employees’ unions, 
demonstrating why such an approach better provides for the public 
interest than unilateral employer control.  It looks to examples from other 
 
*  Professor of Law and Director, Institute for Law and the Workplace, Chicago-Kent 
College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology.  I gratefully acknowledge helpful comments 
from Peter Davis, Tim Hawks, Kurt Kobelt, and Paul Secunda.  I also acknowledge financial 
support from the Marshall-Ewell Research Fund at Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
 
AUTHOR’S NOTE: As this issue of the Marquette Law Review was in press, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision in Wisconsin Education Ass’n 
Council v. Walker, 824 F. Supp. 2d 856 (W.D. Wis. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, Nos. 12-
1854, 12-2011 & 12-2058 (7th Cir. Jan. 18, 2013), which held that the disparate scope of 
bargaining for general and public safety employees was constitutional.  It reversed, however, 
the district court’s holding that the disparate treatment concerning recertification elections 
and dues check-off was unconstitutional.  With respect to dues check-off, the court divided 
two-to-one.  The majority did not dispute the facts as found by the district court, but held that 
as a matter of law the facts did not establish unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.  The 
majority noted, for example, that the category of public safety employees included municipal 
police and firefighter bargaining units represented by unions that had endorsed Governor 
Walker’s opponent, Wisconsin Education Ass’n Council, Nos. 12-1854, 12-2011 & 12-2058, 
slip op. at 22, discounted a statement by Senate Majority Leader Fitzgerald that, if enacted, 
the bill would deny funds to President Obama’s reelection campaign as not necessarily 
reflective of the intentions of the legislature as a whole, id., slip op. at 25, and characterized 
dues check-off as a governmental subsidy of speech, opining that governments may 
discriminate when they subsidize speech, id., slip op. at 10–13.  The Seventh Circuit’s decision 
makes the suggestion in this Article, that employers allow employees to perform 
representation functions on official time, even more important. 
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jurisdictions and presents a range of alternatives for Wisconsin public 
employers and unions to provide for meaningful employee voice. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Republican victories in the 2010 elections led to a dramatic upheaval 
in the law governing public employee collective bargaining in numerous 
states.1  Nowhere was this upheaval more dramatic than in Wisconsin, 
where Act 10 eliminated most collective bargaining rights for most 
Wisconsin public employees, eliminated all collective bargaining rights 
for some Wisconsin public employees, and left a small group of public 
employees largely untouched.  The change in the law was particularly 
poignant because Wisconsin was the first state in the country to enact a 
comprehensive public employee collective bargaining statute.2 
Act 10 greatly increased public employers’ power in dealing with 
their workforces.  One might expect that public officials would 
uniformly welcome such enhanced power.  This was not the case.  
During the debates over Act 10, numerous public officials opposed its 
enactment.3  As these public officials undoubtedly recognized, positive 
involvement by workers through a union designated or selected by a 
majority of the workforce adds value to the public enterprise.4  Worker 
voice and the positive contributions workers make to effective public 
service need not be a casualty of Act 10. 
Accordingly, this Article’s focus is on what avenues for collective 
representation of public employees in Wisconsin remain after Act 10.  
Although Wisconsin public employers now have the legal ability to 
exercise unilateral control over the terms and conditions of employment 
for most of their employees, this Article urges that they continue to 
engage with their workers through their workers’ representatives and 
looks to other jurisdictions to provide examples of how such 
engagement might occur.  Part II provides background to Act 10 and 
reviews the statute and its impact on public employee collective 
bargaining.  Part III details why we should be concerned with the 
survival of public employee collective representation after Act 10.  It 
contrasts unilateral managerial imposition, which breeds hostility and 
resistance, with worker involvement, which leads to creative problem 
 
1. See generally Martin H. Malin, The Legislative Upheaval in Public-Sector Labor Law: 
A Search for Common Elements, 27 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 149 (2012) (discussing changes 
in public employee collective bargaining statutes in more than twelve states following the 
2010 elections). 
2. See JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBLIC WORKERS: GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE UNIONS, THE 
LAW, AND THE STATE, 1900–1962, at 158, 183–84 (2004). 
3. See infra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.   
4. See infra Part III. 
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solving and increased productivity.  Part IV provides options for 
collective representation of public employees in light of the restrictions 
imposed by Act 10.  Looking to the experience in other jurisdictions, 
particularly Tennessee where the law is clear that public employers lack 
authority to bargain collectively in the absence of state statutory 
authorization, Part IV discusses the following options: bargaining in 
spite of the legal prohibition, bargaining with unions with the resulting 
agreements only covering union members, bargaining with unions over 
frameworks that will facilitate union representation of their members, 
meet and confer sessions with unions representing the employer’s 
workers and collaborative conferencing.  Part IV also discusses union 
financial viability in the current hostile legal environment in Wisconsin.  
Part V concludes by suggesting that there may be a silver lining in Act 
10’s gray cloud.  Freed from the constraints of the pre-Act 10 legal 
structure, public employers and the unions that represent their 
employees can create their own structures for providing worker voice in 
ways that add value to the public enterprise. 
II. ACT 10: BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW 
A. Background to Act 10 
The developments leading up to the enactment of Act 10 and the 
fallout from its enactment were particularly dramatic.  On February 15, 
2011, a “budget repair bill” that was the forerunner of Act 10 was 
introduced by the Assembly’s Committee on Assembly Organization at 
the request of newly-elected-Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker.5  The 
proposed radical change to Wisconsin public sector collective bargaining 
law led to demonstrations of a magnitude not seen in Madison since the 
Vietnam War.6  Because the bill involved fiscal matters, a quorum of 
60% of the State Senate was needed to take action.7  Taking advantage 
of this requirement, every Democratic senator left the state to deny the 
Republican majority the quorum.8  In response to the Democrats leaving 
the state and blocking the quorum, Republicans then stripped all fiscal 
 
5. See State ex rel. Ozanne v. Fitzgerald, 2011 WI 43, ¶ 21, 334 Wis. 2d 70, 798 N.W.2d 
436 (Prosser, J., concurring).  
6. See Bill Glauber & Don Walker, Protesters Deriding Bill Again Fill Capitol Square, 
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 27, 2011, at B1, available at 2011 WLNR 3854294. 
7. Fitzgerald, 2011 WI 43, ¶ 21, 334 Wis. 2d 70, 798 N.W.2d 436; see WIS. CONST. 
art. VIII, § 8.   
8. Fitzgerald, 2011 WI 43, ¶ 26, 334 Wis. 2d 70, 798 N.W.2d 436. 
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provisions which required the super-majority quorum from the 
measure.9  On March 9, 2011, with the Democrats still absent, the 
Republicans called for a conference committee meeting at 6:00 p.m.10  
At that meeting, they adopted the stripped-down bill as an 
unamendable conference committee report.11  The State Senate passed 
the revised bill that same day and the Assembly adopted it the following 
day.12  On March 11, 2011, Governor Walker signed Act 10.13 
The signing of Act 10 did not end the drama.  The Dane County 
District Attorney sued contending that the Legislature violated the 
Wisconsin open meetings law by not giving at least 24 hours’ notice of 
the conference committee meeting, and the Dane County Circuit Court 
agreed and enjoined publication of the act.14  However, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court, by a party-line four-to-three vote, granted the state’s 
petition for supervisory/original jurisdiction, held that the circuit court 
violated the State Constitution by enjoining the legislature, and held 
that the legislature’s interpretation of the open meetings law as applied 
to the legislature’s own actions was not subject to judicial review.15  The 
court, thus, vacated the injunction, held that the legislature had not 
violated the open access law, and allowed Act 10 to take effect.16 
The controversy spawned two rounds of recall elections.17  In the 
summer of 2011, nine state senators—six Republicans and three 
Democrats—were recalled, that is, required to stand for another 
election to continue in office.18  Two of the Republicans were defeated.19  
In 2012, the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and four additional 
Republican senators were recalled.20  In 2012, all incumbents, except for 
 
9. Id. ¶ 28. 
10. Id.  
11. Id. 
12. Id. ¶ 29. 
13. Id.  
14. State ex rel. Ozanne v. Fitzgerald, No. 11-CV-1244 at 2 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane County 
May 26, 2011); Fitzgerald, 2011 WI 43, ¶ 1, 334 Wis. 2d 70, 798 N.W.2d 436. 
15. Fitzgerald, 2011 WI 43, ¶¶ 5, 7–9, 13, 334 Wis. 2d 70, 798 N.W.2d 436. 
16. Id. ¶¶ 6, 11. 
17. Paul M. Secunda, The Wisconsin Public-Sector Labor Dispute of 2011, 27 A.B.A. J. 
LAB. & EMP. L. 293, 301–02 (2012).  Under Wisconsin law, incumbents may be recalled only 
after they have been in office for at least one year since their most recent election.  Id. at 301.   
18. Id. 
19. See id. (explaining that four of the targeted Republicans and all three targeted 
Democrats remained in office after the recall). 
20. Id. at 302 n.42. 
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one senator, won their recall elections, but the change in one Senate seat 
gave the Democrats a majority in that body.21 
The drama continues in federal and state court.  In Wisconsin 
Education Ass’n Council v. Walker,22 the U.S. District Court for the 
Western District of Wisconsin upheld the constitutionality of Act 10’s 
provision prohibiting bargaining over anything other than increases in 
base wages, but held that Act 10’s prohibition on payment of union dues 
by payroll deduction and the requirement that exclusive bargaining 
representatives submit to annual recertification elections were 
unconstitutional.23  The decision was not flattering to Governor Walker.  
Act 10 does not apply to those workers it characterizes as “public safety 
employees,” and the constitutional issues before the court focused on 
whether this exclusion denied the other employees equal protection.24  
The court observed that the definition of public safety employees was 
gerrymandered to protect only those unions that had endorsed 
Governor Walker in the 2010 election, while subjecting those unions 
who had endorsed Walker’s opponent—including unions of some law 
enforcement and firefighting employees—to the extreme limitations of 
Act 10.25  The latter group—those subject to the limitations of Act 10—
included Wisconsin Capitol Police, the University of Wisconsin Campus 
Police, state correctional officers, probation and parole officers, 
conservation wardens, fire crash rescue specialists, and state criminal 
investigation agents.26  The court found that Act 10’s distinction between 
general and public safety employees for purposes of allowing or 
prohibiting dues check-off lacked any rational basis and, therefore, 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.27  
 
21. See Alison Bauter, Recount Affirms Lehman’s Win in Senate Recall Race, 
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 2, 2012, http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/recount-
affirms-lehmans-win-in-senate-recall-race-905vroh-161095435.html (explaining the recount in 
Senate candidate Lehman’s recall that declared Lehman the winner and gave state 
Democrats a majority); Jason Stein & Patrick Marley, Senate Dems May Have Majority, 
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 7, 2012, at 1A (noting that Republicans were declared 
winners in three of the four Senate recall elections).   
22. Wis. Educ. Ass’n Council v. Walker, 824 F. Supp. 2d 856 (W.D. Wis. 2012), appeal 
filed, 12-CV-2011 (7th Cir. 2012). 
23. Id. at 859–60. 
24. Id. at 866–70. 
25. Id. at 863, 867, 873.  
26. Id. at 864–65. 
27. Id. at 875–77. 
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The court also found that it violated the First Amendment.28  The court 
distinguished Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Ass’n, where the Supreme 
Court upheld the constitutionality of Idaho’s prohibition on any check-
off of monies to be used for political purposes,29 on the ground that the 
Wisconsin enactment did not apply across the board but instead 
discriminated on the basis of speaker viewpoint.30 
The fact that none of the public employee unions falling into 
the general category endorsed Walker in the 2010 election and 
that all of the unions that endorsed Walker fall within the public 
safety category certainly suggests that unions representing 
general employees have different viewpoints than those of the 
unions representing public safety employees.  Moreover, 
Supreme Court jurisprudence and the evidence of record 
strongly suggests that the exemption of those unions from Act 
10’s prohibition on automatic dues deductions enhances the 
ability of unions representing public safety employees to 
continue to support this Governor and his party.31 
With similar reasoning, the court held that subjecting unions 
representing non-public safety employees to annual recertification 
elections while exempting unions representing public safety employees, 
as defined in Act 10, lacked a rational basis and was an unconstitutional 
denial of equal protection.32  However, with respect to the disparate 
permissible scope of bargaining, the court found no unconstitutional 
denial of equal protection.33  Nevertheless, the court remarked on the 
apparent political motives behind Act 10: 
While the court concludes that the carving out of public 
safety employees under the Act is rationally-related to a 
legitimate government interest in avoiding disruptions by those 
employees, at least facially, it cannot wholly discount evidence 
that the line-drawing between public safety employees and 
general employees was influenced (or perhaps even dictated) by 
whether the unions representing these employees supported 
Governor Walker’s gubernatorial campaign.  The Act’s 
 
28. Id. at 870, 875–77.  
29. Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353 (2009). 
30. Wis. Educ. Ass’n Council, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 872–73. 
31. Id. at 873. 
32. Id. at 869. 
33. Id. at 868. 
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treatment of the Capital Police, who endorsed the Governor’s 
opponent, in comparison to its treatment of state vehicle 
inspectors, who endorsed the Governor, best illustrates this 
suspect line-drawing.34 
To the court, however, “political favoritism is no grounds for 
heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection clause.”35  
Consequently, the court found that the disparate scope of bargaining 
survived rational basis scrutiny.36 
In Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker,37 the Circuit Court for Dane 
County held that Act 10’s provisions prohibiting bargaining over all 
matters except base wages, restricting increases in base wages to 
increases in the cost of living unless approved in a public referendum, 
prohibiting dues check-off and fair share fees and mandating annual 
recertification elections, as applied to local government employees, 
violated the U.S. and Wisconsin State Constitutions.38  The court 
reasoned that Act 10 treated employees who choose to associate with a 
labor organization for the purpose of collective bargaining differently 
from other employees and treated labor organizations differently with 
respect to payroll deductions from all other organizations.39  The court 
further reasoned that Act 10’s prohibition on employers paying the 
employees’ shares of pension contributions violated the City of 
Milwaukee’s “Home Rule” authority.40  As of this writing, both the 
federal and state cases are on appeal, and so the drama continues.41 
B. Overview of Act 10 
Act 10 effectuated a radical overhaul of Wisconsin public sector 
labor relations law.  The Act completely stripped collective bargaining 
rights away from state university faculty, all employees of the University 
of Wisconsin Hospitals and Clinics, and day care and home health care 
 
34. Id. at 867. 
35. Id. at 868. 
36. Id.  
37. Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, No. 11-CV-3774 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane County Sept. 
14, 2012), appeal filed, (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2012). 
38. Id. at 27.  
39. Id. at 17–19.  
40. Id. at 22.  
41. Id.; Wis. Educ. Ass’n Council v. Walker, 824 F. Supp. 2d 856 (W.D. Wis. 2012), 
appeal filed, 12-CV-2011 (7th Cir. 2012). 
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providers.42  As discussed above, it divided the remaining public 
employees into two groups: public safety employees and general 
employees.43  Public safety employees were exempt from the changes 
enacted in Act 10.44  The regular biannual budget act added an 
exemption for municipal transit employees if denial of collective 
bargaining rights to those transit employees will result in a denial of 
federal funds.45 
With respect to general employees, Act 10 prohibits bargaining over 
all subjects except “base wages,” which expressly excludes overtime, 
premium pay, merit pay, performance pay, supplemental pay, and pay 
progressions.46  Base wages may not increase more than the increase in 
the Consumer Price Index as of 180 days before the expiration of the 
collective bargaining agreement unless authority is obtained through a 
voter referendum.47 
Act 10 also did away with interest arbitration for all general 
employees.48  Consequently, even the permitted bargaining over 
increases in base wages has no end point.  With no right to strike or to 
compel their employer to arbitrate impasses in negotiations, Act 10 
leaves general public employees with very little bargaining power. 
Act 10 also requires incumbent exclusive bargaining representatives 
to submit to annual recertification elections to maintain their status as 
exclusive representative.49  In these elections, the representative is 
decertified unless it receives votes equal to at least 51% of the 
employees in the bargaining unit.50  Thus, any employee who does not 
vote is counted as a vote against retaining the existing bargaining 
representative.51  A favorable vote from a majority of employees who 
vote is insufficient; the union must obtain votes from 51% of employees 
in the bargaining unit.52  Indeed, in at least one instance, an incumbent 
 
42. 2011 Wis. Act 10 §§ 265, 279–80. 
43. Id. § 219. 
44. Id.  
45. WIS. DEP’T OF TRANSP. OFFICE OF POLICY, BUDGET & FIN., 2011–13 BIENNIAL 
BUDGET HIGHLIGHTS: 2011 WISCONSIN ACT 32, at 7; see 2011 Wis. Act 32. 
46. 2011 Wis. Act 10 § 314. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. § 237. 
49. Id. § 289. 
50. Id. 
51. See id.  
52. See id.  
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union faced decertification when it received the votes of more than 50% 
but less than 51% of the employees in the unit.53  Such a requirement is 
unprecedented. 
Act 10 also took aim at union treasuries.  It prohibits assessment of 
fair share fees against employees in the bargaining unit who choose not 
to join the union and thereby save the cost of union dues.54  Fair share 
fees are common provisions in collective bargaining agreements.  Under 
fair share arrangements, unions may not require employees who are in 
the bargaining unit but are not members of the union to pay dues, but 
they may require them to pay their pro rata share of the costs of 
representation.55  In other words, fair share fees generally amount to 
dues minus the percentage of dues spent on political and ideological 
activity not directly related to collective bargaining and representation. 
Requiring non-members of the union to pay fair share fees 
recognizes that absent such a provision in the collective bargaining 
agreement, many workers who desire union representation will make 
the economically rational decision not to join the union and pay dues.  
This is because improved wages and working conditions, and most other 
goals sought by a union are, with respect to the workers it represents, 
collective goods.  They cannot be withheld from workers in the 
bargaining unit who choose not to join the union.  Absent a union 
security agreement requiring those who choose not to join to pay a 
service fee, economically rational workers will not join the union 
because each worker will not perceive his or her membership alone as 
strengthening the union and all workers will receive the benefits the 
union achieves regardless of whether they join and pay dues. 56 
As discussed previously, Act 10 also prohibits employers from 
honoring voluntary requests by union members to pay their dues via 
 
53. E-mail from Tim Hawks, Attorney, Hawks Quindel, S.C., to Paul Secunda, Assoc. 
Professor of Law, Marquette Univ. Law Sch. (Mar. 13, 2012, 09:00 CST) (on file with author) 
(discussing the support staff unit at the Elmbrook School District). 
54. 2011 Wis. Act 10 §§ 219, 276. 
55. See generally Locke v. Karass, 555 U.S. 207 (2009) (holding that the local union 
could charge nonmembers a service fee that amounted to the ordinary costs for 
representational activities); Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507 (1991) (holding that 
the union could charge members costs associated with state and national union affiliates); 
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (holding that the agency shop provision of 
the collective bargaining agreement that required non-union workers to pay a fee that 
covered the costs of the union’s collective bargaining activities was valid). 
56. See MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 76–91 (1965). 
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payroll deduction.57  Such a prohibition can have a devastating effect on 
a union’s ability to represent employees.  An example from New York 
illustrates these effects.  New York’s Taylor Law prohibits strikes by 
public employees in that state.58  One penalty against a union for 
engaging in an illegal strike is suspension of the union’s dues check-off.59  
When the United Federation of Teachers engaged in an illegal strike 
against the New York City Public Schools from September 9 through 
September 16, 1976, the New York Public Employment Relations Board 
(NYPERB) suspended its dues check-off.60  Litigation over the penalty 
delayed its imposition until May 1, 1982.61  In the first three months of 
the suspension, the union’s revenue from dues and agency shop fees 
dropped by $1.3 million, and when the cost of dues and fee collection 
was considered, it had lost $2 million.62  Finding that the loss in income 
impaired the union’s ability to provide necessary representational 
services, the NYPERB restored the dues check-off.63 
Act 10 was clearly designed to replace collective representation of 
public sector employees with unilateral employer control.  Governor 
Walker defended the wholesale dismantling of the existing legal regime 
as necessary to give public employers “the tools to reward productive 
workers and improve their operations.  Most crucially, our reforms 
confront the barriers of collective bargaining that currently block 
innovation and reform.”64  The next section explains why the Governor 
is sorely mistaken. 
III. WHY SHOULD WE CARE ABOUT ACT 10? 
If Governor Walker was correct that Wisconsin had to dismantle 
collective representation of public employees to free employers from 
barriers to innovation and reform, one would have expected nearly 
unanimous support from Wisconsin public employers for the Governor’s 
 
57. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.  
58. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 210(1) (Gould Supp. 2012). 
59. Id. § 210(3). 
60. United Fed’n of Teachers, Local 2, 15 N.Y.P.E.R.B. 3136, 3138 (1982). 
61. Id. at 3137. 
62. Id. 
63. Id.  For additional examples of the devastating effect loss of dues check-off can have 
on union finances, see Ann C. Hodges, Maintaining Union Resources in an Era of Public 
Sector Bargaining Retrenchment, 16 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. (forthcoming 2012). 
64. Scott Walker, Op-Ed., Why I’m Fighting in Wisconsin, WALL. ST. J., Mar. 10, 2011, at 
A17. 
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budget repair bill.  Such was not the case.  During the debates over the 
Wisconsin Budget Repair Bill, the Wisconsin Association of School 
Boards reported that many of its member school boards were “gravely 
concerned” that the bill would “immeasurably harm the collaborative 
relationships that exist between school boards and teachers.”65  
Hundreds of local government officials signed an open letter to the 
Governor opposing the bill on similar grounds.66 
Public employers had good reason to oppose Act 10.  Unilaterally-
imposed terms breed resistance while collaboratively developed policies 
bring benefits to employees and the public.  A prime example of this can 
be seen in conflicting approaches to teacher evaluation and discipline.  
The stereotype of teacher unions as defenders of the irremediably 
incompetent who raise the costs of terminating a teacher to the point 
where they make even the most nightmarish teacher fire-proof are 
based on teacher union actions where performance standards are 
developed and implemented unilaterally by management.  In such 
circumstances, we should not fault the union for performing the job into 
which it has been channeled—protecting its members from 
management-imposed action.  However, in a significant number of 
school districts, employers and unions have embraced peer review.67  In 
such cases, management and union cooperatively develop and 
implement performance standards.68  Teachers are evaluated and 
counseled by their peers—who are able to devote greater time than 
principals who may be able to perform only a few observations per 
teacher.69  Union involvement in setting and implementing standards of 
teacher performance transforms the union into a defender of the 
professional standards.70  Attrition rates for poor performing teachers 
tend to be higher in districts embracing peer review than in districts that 
follow the traditional unilateral command and control model.71 
 
65. Letter from John H. Ashley, Exec. Dir., Wis. Ass’n of Sch. Bds., to Hon. Alberta 
Darling & Hon. Robin Vos, Co-chairs, Wis. Legislature Joint Comm. on Fin. (Feb. 15, 2011) 
(copy on file with author). 
66. See Erin Richards et al., Clash Continues: Many City Officials Think Union Limits 
Go Too Far, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 27, 2011, at 1B. 
67. See Martin H. Malin & Charles Taylor Kerchner, Charter Schools and Collective 
Bargaining: Compatible Marriage or Illegitimate Relationship?, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
885, 904 (2007). 
68. See id. at 905.  
69. See id. at 905, 934. 
70. See id. at 905. 
71. See id. at 904–06. 
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One of the most extensive efforts at expanded worker involvement 
in workplace decision-making began in 1993 when President William 
Jefferson Clinton issued Executive Order 12,871 which, among other 
things, established a National Partnership Council and called for the 
creation of labor-management partnerships throughout the executive 
branch.72  Shortly before President George W. Bush took office, the 
Heritage Foundation called on him to rescind Executive Order 12,871, 
viewing the partnerships as an impediment to the new administration’s 
ability to implement its policy agenda.73  Upon taking office, President 
Bush obliged.  On February 17, 2001, he revoked the Clinton executive 
order and directed agency heads to “promptly move to rescind any 
orders, rules, regulations, guidelines, or policies implementing or 
enforcing Executive Order 12,871.”74 
President George W. Bush and Governor Walker appear to share a 
vision of workplace efficiency in which employees robotically obey 
commands that come down from above and are powerless to block 
innovations and reforms dictated by management.  The record under 
the Clinton Executive Order, however, does not support this vision.  
The scope of bargaining mandated by the Federal Service Labor 
Management Relations Act, the statute which governs collective 
bargaining between federal agencies and unions representing their 
workers, is extremely narrow.75  Successful partnerships under the 
Clinton Executive Order did not confine themselves to topics on which 
bargaining was legally required.  They branched out into what the 
National Partnership Council characterized as “non-traditional issues,” 
including: reorganizations, quality issues, improvements in customer 
service, re-engineering and streamlining work, impact of new 
technology, reductions in force, budget and staffing levels, privatization, 
and procurement.76  Rather than impede workplace innovation and 
efficiency, labor-management partnerships under the Clinton Executive 
Order fostered it.  Examples detailed in a report77 from the Office of 
 
72. Exec. Order No. 12,871, 3 C.F.R. 655 (1993). 
73. Robert E. Moffit, George Nesterczuk & Donald J. Devine, Backgrounder No. 1404, 
Taking Charge of Federal Personnel, HERITAGE FOUND. (Jan. 10, 2001), http://www.heritage.
org/research/reports/2001/01/taking-charge-of-federal-personnel.  
74. See Exec. Order No. 13,203, 3 C.F.R. 761 (2001). 
75. See 5 U.S.C. § 7106 (2006).  
76. NAT’L P’SHIP COUNCIL, OPM-NPC-09, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON 
PROGRESS IN LABOR-MANAGEMENT PARTNERSHIPS 19 (1997). 
77. LABOR-MANAGEMENT PARTNERSHIP: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, U.S. OFF. 
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Personnel Management at the end of President Clinton’s second term 
include: 
  Partnering between the Internal Revenue Service and 
National Treasury Employees Union to modernize and 
restructure the IRS, resulting in measurable improvements in 
customer service and job satisfaction.78 
  Partnership between American Federation of Government 
Employees (AFGE) Local 3973 and Defense Contract 
Management Command’s Raytheon Missile Systems facility 
resulted in overwhelming improvement in customer service 
ratings as workload increased 100% and the workforce 
downsized, with $900,000 saved from the reduction in labor-
management litigation.79 
  The U.S. Mint and AFGE Mint Council engaged in joint 
strategic planning, resulting in the U.S. Mint’s consistent ranking 
near the top in the American Customer Satisfaction Index and its 
production of record numbers of coins and return of record 
profits to taxpayers.80 
  The Social Security Administration (SSA) and AFGE 
partnership reengineered practices related to SSA’s toll free 
number, resulting in SSA outscoring all other organizations for 
800 number customer satisfaction in 1995, and in a 1999 customer 
satisfaction rating of 88%.81 
  Partnerships between the James A. Haley Veterans’ 
Hospital and AFGE Local 547, the Florida Nurses Association 
and the Tampa Professional Nurses Unit reduced delivery time 
for critical medication from ninety-two minutes to twenty 
minutes, cut turnaround time for x-ray reports from eight days to 
one day, and reduced processing time for pension and 
compensation exams from thirty-one days to eighteen days.82 
  A National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU)-Customs 
Service partnership designed a seven-step strategy to increase 
 
PERSONNEL MGMT.,  http://www.opm.gov/lmr/report/index.htm (last updated Jan. 12, 2000). 
78. Id. § 1(2).  
79. Id.  
80. Id. § 2. 
81. Id. § 3(1). 
82. Id. § 3(2). 
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seizures of illegal drugs.  During the six month life of the joint 
action plan, narcotics seizures increased by 42% and drug 
currency seizures increased by 74%.83 
  Partnership between the Defense Distribution Depot in 
San Joaquin and AFGE Local 1546 saved $950,000 per year by 
reducing workplace accidents by 20% and ergonomic injuries by 
40%, reduced overtime expenses from $9.8 million to $1.4 
million and reduced production costs from $25.42 per unit to 
$23.48 per unit.84 
Workplaces where employees are empowered and challenged to 
take responsibility for the efficient operation of their agencies and the 
craft, artistic, or professional aspects of their work are commonly 
referred to as “high performance workplaces.”85  There is evidence from 
the private sector that high performance workplaces are significantly 
more efficient and productive workplaces than traditional workplaces 
and that unionized high performance workplaces are even more 
efficient and productive than their non-unionized counterparts.86  
Economists Sandra Black and Lisa Lynch simulated a base case of a 
non-union manufacturer with little employee involvement.87  They found 
that unionized firms with little employee involvement had productivity 
levels 15% lower than the base case.88  Non-unionized firms with high 
employee involvement had productivity levels 10.6% higher than the 
base case.89  But “adding unionization to this already high-performance 
workplace is associated with an impressive 20% increase in labor 
productivity.”90  They then examined the actual mean characteristics of 
unionized and nonunionized firms in a sample of manufacturers.91  They 
found that the unionized firms averaged productivity 16% higher than 
 
83. Id. § 3(3). 
84. Id.  
85. See Carol Gill, Union Impact on the Effective Adoption of High Performance Work 
Practices, 19 HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. REV. 39, 39 (2009) (referring to these practices as 
“high performance work practices”). 
86. See id. at 42–43.  
87. Sandra E. Black & Lisa M. Lynch, The New Workplace: What Does It Mean for 
Productivity?, in 1 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION SERIES: 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTIETH ANNUAL MEETING 60, 64 (Paula B. Voos ed., 1998). 
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the base case while the nonunionized firms’ productivity averaged 11% 
lower than the base case.92  Treating unions as partners and involving 
them in administering employee participation programs results in 
positive collective employee voice and product improvement.93  Unions 
provide independent employee voice that plays a crucial role in 
successfully developing and sustaining high performance workplaces.94 
In a report released in 1996, a task force of the Secretary of Labor 
catalogued numerous examples where workers, operating through their 
unions, partnered with public employers to increase efficiency and 
improve public services.95  I and others have related numerous 
additional examples.96  The many Wisconsin public officials who 
opposed Act 10 expressed concern that enactment would impede the 
labor-management cooperative efforts that had improved public 
services throughout the state.97  But such a result is not inevitable.  The 
next section explores ways in which parties may be able to maintain 
positive relationships and outcomes in spite of Act 10’s dismantling of 
collective bargaining rights in Wisconsin. 
IV. LIFE AFTER ACT 10 
Achieving the types of labor-management partnerships that lead to 
improved public services requires considerable risk-taking on the part of 
managers and labor leaders.  Managers must take the risk of sharing 
decision-making responsibility with labor, even though the legal regime 
gives management the right of unilateral control.  Labor leaders must 
 
92. Id. 
93. See William N. Cooke, Product Quality Improvement Through Employee 
Participation: The Effects of Unionization and Joint Union-Management Administration, 46 
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 119, 132 (1992). 
94. See Gill, supra note 85. 
95. U.S. SEC’Y OF LABOR’S TASK FORCE ON EXCELLENCE IN STATE & LOCAL GOV’T 
THROUGH LABOR-MGMT. COOPERATION, WORKING TOGETHER FOR PUBLIC SERVICE 
(1996) [hereinafter WORKING TOGETHER FOR PUBLIC SERVICE], available at 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/key_workplace/252/.  
96. See DAVID LEWIN ET AL., GETTING IT RIGHT: EMPIRICAL 
EVIDENCE  AND  POLICY IMPLICATIONS FROM RESEARCH ON PUBLIC-SECTOR 
UNIONISM AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 16–22 (2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1792942; Stephen Goldsmith & Mark E. 
Schneider, Partnering for Public Value: New Approaches in Public Employee Labor-
Management Relations, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 415, 416–18 (2003); Martin H. Malin, The 
Paradox of Public Sector Labor Law, 84 IND. L.J. 1369, 1392–96 (2009) [hereinafter Malin, 
Paradox]; Malin & Kerchner, supra note 67, at 903–11. 
97. See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.  
12 MALIN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/6/2013  9:30 PM 
2012] LIFE AFTER ACT 10? 639 
risk giving up the ability to criticize management’s unilateral decisions 
and must be willing to share in the responsibility for decisions jointly 
determined and the outcomes resulting from those decisions.  
Elsewhere, I have argued that the legal regime governing public sector 
collective bargaining most common in the United States channels 
parties away from such risk taking.98  Taking these risks is easier where 
the legal regime provides a strong system of labor and management 
rights on which to fall back.  As Clinton administration Office of 
Personnel Management Director Janice Lachance observed, 
“[P]artnership is the high wire and collective bargaining is the safety 
net.”99 
Although Act 10 has dismantled the strong legal regime of labor and 
management rights that existed in Wisconsin prior to 2011, it need not 
take down the labor-management cooperative efforts that enhanced 
public services in the state.100  Wisconsinites seeking examples of labor-
management cooperation despite hostile state law should look to 
Norfolk, Virginia. 
By statute, Virginia expressly prohibits all public employee 
collective bargaining.101  Nevertheless, the Norfolk Federation of 
Teachers, an affiliate of the American Federation of Teachers, 
represents teachers in the Norfolk Public School System and the parties 
negotiate memoranda of understanding, even though such agreements 
are not legally enforceable.102  Working together, the union and the 
school district, along with other elements of the Norfolk community 
transformed the school system into a model urban school district which, 
in 2005, received the Broad Prize for the top urban school district in the 
 
98. See Malin, Paradox, supra note 96, at 1398–99. 
99. OPM Director Lachance Addresses Future of Federal Workforce, 36 GOV’T EMP. 
REL. REP.  418, 422 (1998) (quoting American Federation of Government Employees 
President  John Sturdivant). 
100. One of the most effective partnerships begun under the Clinton Executive Order, 
the partnership between the National Federation of Federal Employees and the U.S. Forest 
Service continued throughout the Bush administration and continues today under the Obama 
administration.  William Dougan, Nat’l President, NFFE & Hank Kashden, former Assoc. 
Chief, Forest Serv., Address at the National Academy of Arbitrators Conference held in 
connection with the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission’s Annual Conference on 
Wisconsin Public Sector Labor Relations (April 27, 2011).   
101. VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1–57.2 (2002).  
102. See Ann C. Hodges & William Warwick, The Sheathed Sword: Public-Sector Union 
Efficacy in Non-Bargaining States, 27 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 275, 285 (2012). 
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country.103  As the Norfolk example illustrates, public employers can still 
engage their workers effectively through their unions in spite of laws 
similar to Act 10.  This section now turns to strategies that may be 
adapted from other jurisdictions. 
A. Bargain Anyway 
The system of collective bargaining codified for most private sector 
workers in the National Labor Relations Act, and adapted to the public 
sector in most public employee labor relations acts, confers on a labor 
organization designated or selected by a majority of the employees in an 
appropriate bargaining unit the status of exclusive representative of all 
employees in the unit.104  All employees in the unit are bound by the 
contract negotiated by the union and the employer may not bypass the 
union and deal directly with the employees.105  The duty to bargain, 
however, attaches only to matters that are considered to be mandatory 
subjects of bargaining.106 
Although Act 10 expressly designates all subjects other than 
increases in base wages as prohibited subjects of bargaining, it adds no 
new mechanism for enforcing the prohibition.  This is not surprising, 
considering that Act 10’s purpose is to empower management.107  Act 10, 
however, could have empowered management by simply designating all 
subjects other than increases in base wages as permissive subjects of 
bargaining.  If a matter is a permissive subject of bargaining, 
management may act unilaterally.108  Management has no obligation to 
provide the employees’ exclusive bargaining representative information 
relevant to the subject,109 and it may by-pass the exclusive representative 
and deal directly with individual employees or its self-selected group of 
 
103. Id. at 286.  The Broad Prize for Urban Education “is awarded each year to honor 
urban school districts that demonstrate the greatest overall performance and improvement in 
student achievement while reducing achievement gaps among low-income and 
minority students.”  Overview, BROAD PRIZE FOR URB. EDUC., http://www.broadprize.org/a
bout/overview.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2012). 
104. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2006). 
105. See J. I. Case Co. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 321 U.S. 322, 334–35, 339 (1944). 
106. See, e.g., City of Brookfield v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 87 Wis. 2d 819, 829, 
275 N.W.2d 723, 728 (1979); Racine Educ. Ass’n v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 214 Wis. 
2d 352, 359, 571 N.W.2d 887, 890 (Ct. App. 1997). 
107. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.  
108. See, e.g., First Nat’l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981). 
109. See, e.g., Vill. of Franklin Park v. Ill. State Labor Relations Bd., 638 N.E.2d 1144, 
1148 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). 
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employees.110   
A party who insists on its position to the point of impasse with 
respect to a permissive subject of bargaining commits an unfair labor 
practice.111  The same rule applies to a prohibited subject of bargaining.  
Thus, at least as far as the collective bargaining process is concerned, 
legally, it makes no difference if a matter is designated as a prohibited 
subject of bargaining or as a permissive subject of bargaining.  The 
critical difference between the two is that unlike a prohibited subject, a 
permissive subject may, by agreement, be included in the collective 
bargaining agreement and enforced.112 
Therefore, designating matters as prohibited, rather than permissive, 
subjects of bargaining further empowers management by allowing it to 
walk away from any agreements it reaches with respect to those 
subjects.  When a public employer agrees with an exclusive bargaining 
representative concerning a matter on which it had no legal authority to 
agree, the agreement is legally unenforceable.113  Thus, Act 10’s 
designation of all subjects other than increases in base wages as 
prohibited subjects of bargaining renders agreements between an 
employer and an exclusive bargaining representative unenforceable. 
In states where collective bargaining is prohibited, negotiations 
nevertheless occur and agreements are reached.  Although the 
agreements are legally unenforceable, they are usually complied with 
out of mutual respect and cooperation.114 
One of the most prominent examples of a public employer engaging 
in collective bargaining and abiding by collective bargaining agreements 
despite the absence of legal authority to do so is the City of Memphis, 
 
110. See, e.g., Corpus Christi Fire Fighters Ass’n v. City of Corpus Christi, 10 S.W.3d 
723, 728 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999). 
111. See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 
349 (1958). 
112. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1480 (John E. Higgins, Jr., ed., 6th ed. 2012). 
113. See, e.g., Cnty. of Chautauqua v. Civil Serv. Emps. Ass’n Local 1000, 869 N.E.2d 1, 
4 (N.Y. 2007); In re City of New York v. Uniformed Fire Officers Ass’n Local 854, 739 N.E.2d 
719, 724 (N.Y. 2000).  Even an agreement to arbitrate alleged violations of unilaterally 
promulgated employer policy with respect to prohibited subjects of bargaining may be 
unenforceable.  See Chi. Teachers Union Local No. 1 Am. Fed’n of Teachers v. Ill. Educ. 
Labor Relations Bd., 778 N.E.2d 1232, 1239 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (enforcing arbitration award 
after finding that issue fell outside the scope of statutorily prohibited subjects of bargaining). 
114. See Hodges & Warwick, supra note 102, at 285; Ann C. Hodges, Lessons from the 
Laboratory: The Polar Opposites on the Public Sector Labor Law Spectrum, 18 CORNELL J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 735, 748, 752 (2009). 
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Tennessee.  Although no statute expressly prohibits public employee 
collective bargaining in Tennessee, the courts have held that—absent 
express statutory authorization—units of local government lack 
authority to engage in collective bargaining and enter into collective 
bargaining agreements.115  Nevertheless, Memphis has contracts with 
thirteen unions covering twenty-four bargaining units.116 
Many of the Memphis contracts purport to be negotiated with the 
union as exclusive bargaining representative of all employees in a 
designated bargaining unit.117  Most prominent among these are 
memoranda of understanding between the City of Memphis and 
AFSCME Local 1733.  The Memphis-AFSCME collective bargaining 
relationship dates to 1968 when Memphis sanitation workers struck for 
recognition.118  
The principal AFSCME-Memphis memorandum of understanding 
(MOU) covers a bargaining unit consisting of designated job 
classifications in the “Public Works Division, Division of Public Services 
and Neighborhoods, General Services Division, Engineering, Police 
Services Division, Fire Services Division, Park Services and the 
[municipal] Judicial System.”119  In the memorandum, the City expressly 
recognizes the union “as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for 
all employees” in the specified bargaining unit and provides that “no 
other labor organization shall be recognized unless they are designated 
 
115. See Local Union 760 of the Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. City of Harriman, No. 
E2000-00367-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 1801856, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 8, 2000); Weakley 
Cnty. Mun. Elec. Sys. v. Vick, 309 S.W.2d 792, 804 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957).  Prior to enactment 
of the Virginia statute, the Virginia Supreme Court had held similarly.  See Commonwealth v. 
Cnty. Bd. of Arlington Cnty., 232 S.E.2d 30, 44 (Va. 1977). 
 116.  See Union MOU’s, CITY OF MEMPHIS, www.cityofmemphis.org/framework.aspx?p
age=1344 (last visited October 17, 2012) (listing and providing links to City of Memphis 
memoranda of understanding with thirteen unions representing its employees). 
117. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Between City of Memphis and American 
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees AFL-CIO, Local 1733: Solid Waste 
Management, Public Works Division, Public Works Division, Public Service Division, Police 
Services Division, Fires Services Division, Park Services, Engineering, Public Works Division, 
Judicial System, art. 1 (May 3, 2011) [hereinafter AFSCME-Memphis Main Contract], 
available at www.cityofmemphis.org/pdf_forms/MOU/Main.pdf; Memorandum of 
Understanding Between City of Memphis and Communications Workers of America, Local 
3806, art. 1 (Apr. 19, 2011) [hereinafter CWA-Memphis Contract], available at 
http://www.cityofmemphis.org/pdf_forms/MOU/CWA.pdf. 
118. See Earl Caldwell, Sanitation Strike in Memphis Ends, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1968, 
at 1.  Martin Luther King Jr. was in Memphis supporting the striking workers when he was 
assassinated.  Id.   
119. AFSCME-Memphis Main Contract, supra note 117, art. 1. 
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by a majority of the non-supervisory employees of the appropriate 
unit.”120  Identical exclusive recognition is provided to AFSCME Local 
1733 in separate memoranda of understanding covering a secretarial and 
general clerical bargaining unit;121 a bargaining unit within the Division 
of Community Enhancement, Code Enforcement;122 a bargaining unit of 
employees in the Police Property, Evidence, and Photo Lab;123 and a 
bargaining unit of employees in the Engineering Division Survey 
Service Center.124   
All of the AFSCME-Memphis memoranda purport to govern wages; 
longevity pay; retirement; job classifications; discipline and discharge; 
holidays; vacations; sick leave; employee assistance programs; leaves of 
absence; time off due to a death in the employee’s immediate family; 
hours of work, reporting, call-back, and standby pay; health and safety; 
overtime; shift work; insurance; health care plans; training; 
subcontracting; payroll deduction of union dues; and a no strike 
agreement.125  Although they are not legally enforceable, they provide 
 
120. Id. 
121. Memorandum of Understanding Between City of Memphis and American 
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees AFL-CIO, Local 1733: Secretary B 
and C, and General Clerk A and B, art. 1 (May 3, 2011) [hereinafter AFSCME-Memphis 
Clerical Contract], available at http://www.cityofmemphis.org/pdf_forms/MOU/Secretary_Ge
neral_Clerk.pdf. 
122. Memorandum of Understanding Between City of Memphis and American 
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees AFL-CIO, Local 1733: Housing and 
Community Development Code Enforcement, art. 1 (May 3, 2011) [hereinafter AFSCME-
Memphis Code Enforcement Contract], available at http://www.cityofmemphis.org/pdf_forms
/MOU/HCD_Code.pdf. 
123. Memorandum of Understanding Between City of Memphis and American 
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees AFL-CIO, Local 1733: Police 
Property & Evidence and Photo Lab, art. 1 (May 3, 2011) [hereinafter AFSCME-Memphis 
Crime Lab Contract], available at http://www.cityofmemphis.org/pdf_forms/MOU/Property_
Evidence_Photo_Lab.pdf. 
124. Memorandum of Understanding Between City of Memphis and American 
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees AFL-CIO, Local 1733: Survey Service 
Center, art. 1 (May 3, 2011) [hereinafter AFSCME-Memphis Survey Service Contract], 
available at http://www.cityofmemphis.org/pdf_forms/MOU/Survey_Service_Center.pdf. 
125. See AFSCME-Memphis Main Contract, supra note 117; AFSCME-Memphis 
Clerical Contract, supra note 121; AFSCME-Memphis Code Enforcement Contract, supra 
note 122; AFSCME-Memphis Crime Lab Contract, supra note 123; AFSCME-Memphis 
Survey Service Contract, supra note 124.  Governor Walker would regard such bargaining as 
an impediment to innovation and reform, see Walker, supra note 64, but that does not appear 
to be the case in Memphis.  For example, AFSCME and the City of Memphis recently agreed 
to replace its fleet of trash collection trucks which require two to three workers per truck with 
modern automated trucks that require only one worker.  See Editorial, AFSCME, City Find 
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for enforcement through grievance procedures culminating in 
arbitration.126  Although arbitration is final and binding with respect to 
suspensions and discharge, on all other matters it is advisory to the 
City.127 
Memphis Police radio dispatchers are represented by Local 3806 of 
the Communication Workers of America (CWA).128  The memorandum 
of understanding between the City and CWA covers topics comparable 
to those covered in the AFSCME memoranda and also covers internal 
investigation procedures, personnel file review, residency, secondary 
employment, uniform allowances, career development, and tuition 
reimbursement.129  As with the AFSCME memoranda, the CWA 
memorandum provides that the City recognizes the union “as the sole 
and exclusive bargaining agent for all permanent full-time Police Radio 
Dispatchers.”130  As with the AFSCME memoranda, the CWA 
memorandum is enforceable through a grievance procedure culminating 
in arbitration and arbitration is final and binding with respect to 
suspensions and discharge but advisory with respect to all other 
matters.131 
Local 369D of the International Union of Operating Engineers 
(IUOE) represents City of Memphis employees in six bargaining units.132  
 
Common Ground, COM. APPEAL, Aug. 23, 2012, at 4A.  The new trucks reportedly enhance 
worker safety, provide a basis that may lead to the City bringing refuse collection that had 
been contracted out back in-house and could save the City between $2 million and $4 million 
per year.  Id.  
126. See AFSCME-Memphis Main Contract, supra note 117, art. 5; AFSCME-Memphis 
Clerical Contract, supra note 121, art. 5; AFSCME-Memphis Code Enforcement Contract, 
supra note 122, art. 5; AFSCME-Memphis Crime Lab Contract, supra note 123, art. 5; 
AFSCME-Memphis Survey Service Contract, supra note 124, art. 5. 
127. AFSCME-Memphis Main Contract, supra note 117, art. 6; AFSCME-Memphis 
Clerical Contract, supra note 121, art. 6; AFSCME-Memphis Code Enforcement Contract, 
supra note 122, art. 6; AFSCME-Memphis Crime Lab Contract, supra note 123, art. 6; 
AFSCME-Memphis Survey Service Contract, supra note 124, art. 6. 
128. CWA-Memphis Contract, supra note 117, art. 1. 
129. Id. (see table of contents for a complete list of topics covered by this 
memorandum). 
130. Id.  
131. Id. arts. 10–11. 
 132.  Memorandum  of  Understanding  Between  City  of  Memphis  and  International 
Union of Operating Engineers, Local 369D: Animal Shelter (Mar. 25, 2011) [hereinafter IUO
E-Memphis Animal Shelter Contract], available at http://www.cityofmemphis.org/pdf_forms/
MOU/Animal_Shelter.pdf; Memorandum of Understanding Between City of Memphis and 
International Union of Operating Engineers Local 369D: Construction Inspectors (Mar. 25, 2
011) [hereinafter IUOE-Memphis Construction Inspectors Contract], available at http://www.
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In memoranda of understanding in effect in five of those units, the City 
recognizes the union as the “sole bargaining agent” for all regular, full-
time employees in the union and grants “exclusive recognition to the 
Union.”133  As with the AFSCME and CWA memoranda, the Animal 
Shelter memorandum is enforced through a grievance and arbitration 
procedure that culminates in arbitration that is final and binding with 
respect to suspensions and discharges but advisory with respect to all 
other matters.134  Under the other four IUOE memoranda, arbitration is 
final and binding with respect to all matters.135 
In some other Memphis bargaining units, the memoranda of 
understanding are not as explicit with respect to whether recognition of 
the union is exclusive to the bargaining unit.  Three memoranda of 
understanding cover employees represented by the International 
Association of Machinists.  In each, the City recognizes the union “as 
the designated representative” for employees in the defined bargaining 
units and provides that “no other labor organization shall be recognized 
unless they be recognized by a majority of the non-supervisory 
 
cityofmemphis.org/pdf_forms/MOU/CONSTRUCTION_INSPECTORS.pdf; Memorandum 
of Understanding Between City of Memphis and International Union of Operating 
Engineers, Local 369D: Dispatchers, Public Works Division, Engineering Division (Mar. 25, 
2011) [hereinafter IUOE-Memphis Public Works Dispatchers Contract], available at 
http://www.cityofmemphis.org/pdf_forms/MOU/DISPATCHERS.pdf; Memorandum of 
Understanding Between City of Memphis and International Union of Operating Engineers, 
Local 369D: Stoppage Operator/Sewer Environment (Mar. 25, 2011) [hereinafter 
IUOE-Memphis Stoppage Operators Contract], available at http://www.cityofmemphis.org/pd
f_forms/MOU/STOPPAGE_OPERATOR.pdf; Memorandum of Understanding Between 
City of Memphis and International Union of Operating Engineers: Treatment Plants, Sewer 
Stations, Flood Control Facilities, Pollution Control (Mar. 25, 2011) [hereinafter IUOE-
Memphis Treatment Plants Contract], available at http://www.cityofmemphis.org/pdf_forms/
MOU/TREATMENT_PLANTS.pdf; Memorandum of Understanding Between City of 
Memphis and International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 369: Heavy Equipment 
Operators (Mar. 25, 2011) [hereinafter IUOE-Memphis Heavy Equipment Operators 
Contract], available at http://www.cityofmemphis.org/pdf_forms/MOU/Heavy_Equipment_O
perators.pdf.  
133. IUOE-Memphis Animal Shelter Contract, supra note 132, art. 2; IUOE-Memphis 
Construction Inspectors Contract, supra note 132, art. 2; IUOE-Memphis Public Works 
Dispatchers Contract, supra note 132, art. 2; IUOE-Memphis Stoppage Operators Contract, 
supra note 132, art. 2; IUOE-Memphis Treatment Plants Contract, supra note 132, art. 2. 
134. IUOE-Memphis Animal Shelter Contract, supra note 132, art. 6. 
135. IUOE-Memphis Construction Inspectors Contract, supra note 132, art. 6; IUOE-
Memphis Public Works Dispatchers Contract, supra note 132, art. 6; IUOE-Memphis 
Stoppage Operators Contract, supra note 132, art. 6; IUOE-Memphis Treatment Plants 
Contract, supra note 132, art. 6. 
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personnel of the appropriate classification.”136  Unlike the other 
memoranda of understanding, the Machinists’ memoranda do not 
expressly state that the union is the representative for all bargaining unit 
employees and do not use the adjective “exclusive” to characterize the 
recognition.  As with most of the other bargaining units, the Machinists’ 
memoranda provide for enforcement through grievance procedures that 
culminate in arbitration that is binding for suspension and discharge 
cases but advisory as to all other matters.137  An agreement with the 
Memphis Police Association recognizes that union as “designated 
bargaining representative” for police officers below the rank of 
lieutenant.138  The agreement does not use the words “all” to modify 
employees or “exclusive” to modify representative and does not contain 
language found in the Machinists’ memoranda precluding the City from 
recognizing another labor organization.  It is unclear whether the 
Memphis recognition of the Police Association is exclusive or limited to 
its members.  Interestingly, the police agreement provides for binding 
arbitration over all matters.139  As developed in the next section, 
Memphis also has several bargaining units in which it has recognized 
unions as representatives of their members only. 
Prior to 2011, public school teachers in Tennessee had statutory 
rights to organize and bargain collectively under the Education 
 
136. Memorandum of Understanding Between City of Memphis, Division of Fire 
Services and Desoto Lodge No. 3 International Association of Machinists and Aerospace 
Workers AFL-CIO, art. 2 (May 17, 2011) [hereinafter IAMAW-Memphis Fire Services 
Contract], available at http://www.cityofmemphis.org/pdf_forms/MOU/Fire_Services.pdf; 
Memorandum of Understanding Between City of Memphis, Division of Police Services and 
Desoto Lodge No. 3 International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers AFL-
CIO, art. 2 (May 17, 2011) [hereinafter IAMAW-Memphis Police Services 
Contract],  available  at  http://www.cityofmemphis.org/pdf_forms/MOU/Police_Services.pdf; 
Memorandum of Understanding Between City of Memphis, Division of General Services and 
Desoto Lodge No. 3 International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers AFL-
CIO, art. 2 (May 17, 2011) [hereinafter IAMAW-Memphis General Services Contract], 
available at http://www.cityofmemphis.org/pdf_forms/MOU/General_Services.pdf. 
137. IAMAW-Memphis Fire Services Contract, supra note 136, art. 7; IAMAW-
Memphis Police Services Contract, supra note 136, art. 7; IAMAW-Memphis General 
Services Contract, supra note 136, art. 7. 
138. Agreement Between Memphis Police Association and the City of Memphis, art. 2 
(Mar. 25, 2011), available at http://www.cityofmemphis.org/pdf_forms/MOU/MPA.pdf.  
139. Id. art. 12.  Article 12 of this Agreement suggests that the agreement covers all 
bargaining unit members, not just members of the Police Association, because it expressly 
provides for non-members to process their own grievances individually and that the 
association is not responsible for non-members’ arbitration costs.  Id. 
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Professional Negotiations Act.140  Other public school employees, 
however, lacked any statutory right to bargain collectively.  Despite the 
absence of express statutory authority the Board of Education of the 
Memphis Public Schools has recognized AFSCME as exclusive 
representative for two bargaining units: one consisting of administrative 
and clerical employees,141 and another consisting of custodial, 
warehouse, cafeteria and nutrition service center employees.142  Both 
provide for enforcement through grievance procedures culminating in 
arbitration.143  The clerical employees’ memorandum provides that the 
arbitrator’s decision is binding unless the parties determine that it 
usurps the Board of Education’s authority under the laws of 
Tennessee,144 while in the other unit the determination of whether the 
arbitrator’s decision usurps Board authority is left to the Board.145 
Some ambiguity exists in the recognition the Memphis City Schools 
has accorded Service Employees International Union (SEIU) Local 205 
in a bargaining unit of building engineers, nutritional services managers, 
and driver education operations managers.146  Their memorandum of 
understanding merely “recognizes the Union as the bargaining 
representative” without describing the recognition as “exclusive” and 
using the word “certain” rather than “all” in describing the employees in 
 
140. See 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts 378 (repealing the Education Professional Negotiations 
Act); see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-5-601 (2009) (the former “Education Professional 
Negotiations Act”).  
141. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Memphis City Schools and Local 
1733 of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees AFL-CIO, art. 
3 (Dec. 18, 2009) [hereinafter AFSCME-Memphis Office Professionals Clerical Unit 
Contract], available at http://www.mcsk12.net/forms/AFSCME%20Local%201733%20_Cleric
al_%20Contract%20%202009%20-%202012.pdf. 
142. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Memphis City Schools and Local 
1733 of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees AFL-CIO, art. 
3 (Nov. 1, 2010) [hereinafter Memphis City Schools-AFSCME Blue Collar Contract], 
available at http://www.mcsk12.net/HR/docs/AFSCME%20Local%201733%20Contract%202
010-2013.pdf. 
143. See AFSCME-Memphis Office of Professionals Clerical Unit Contract, supra note 
141, art. 8; Memphis City Schools-AFSCME Blue Collar Contract, supra note 142, art. 7. 
144. AFSCME-Memphis Office of Professionals Clerical Unit Contract, supra note 141, 
art. 8. 
145. Memphis City Schools-AFSCME Blue Collar Contract, supra note 142, art. 7. 
146. See Memorandum of Understanding Between Memphis City Schools and Service 
Employees International Union, Local 205: Building Engineers and Nutrition Services 
Managers Unit (August 2010), available at http://www.mcsk12.net/eagenda/Board%20Work
%20Session-August%209,%202010%20on%20Monday,%20August%2009,%202010/BEC05
D46-730E-472F-9CF5-5624446350F1.pdf. 
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the bargaining unit.147  The recognition appears to be exclusive, as the 
memorandum provides that only the union may process grievances 
beyond the second step of the grievance procedure and only the union 
may take grievances to arbitration.148  As with one of the AFSCME 
memoranda, the SEIU memorandum provides for enforcement through 
a grievance procedure culminating in arbitration, but also provides that 
the arbitrator’s award is not binding if the Board of Education 
determines that it usurps Board authority.149 
The Memphis City Schools have recognized the UAW and a 
coalition of craft unions using virtually identical cautious language: 
“While affirming its legally constituted authority to take independent 
action on matters pertaining to wages, hours, and working conditions, 
the Board hereby recognizes the Union as the (certified) representative 
of certain employees” in the designated bargaining unit.150  Both 
memoranda of understanding provide for grievance procedures 
culminating in advisory arbitration, but the arbitrator’s decision is 
effective unless the Board of Education affirmatively rejects it.151 
Thus, despite the absence of express statutory authority to do so, 
and clear case law that holds that doing so in the absence of statutory 
authority is ultra vires, the City of Memphis and the Memphis City 
Schools have for quite some time engaged in traditional collective 
bargaining with a number of different unions representing their 
employees.  The memoranda of understanding all provide for 
enforcement through grievance and arbitration procedures but they 
differ on the extent to which the arbitrator’s decision is final and 
binding.  Those differences, to a certain extent, are irrelevant.  Because 
the memoranda of understanding are not legally enforceable, no 
 
147. Id. art. 6. 
148. Id. art. 9. 
149. Id. 
150. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Memphis City Schools and Local 
3036 and United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers on America 
UAW,   art.   1   (effective   Jan.   17,   2009)   [hereinafter   Memphis-UAW   Contract],  
available at http://www.mcsk12.net/HR/forms/uaw%20contract%202009%20-%202013.pdf; 
Memorandum of Understanding Between the Memphis City Schools and Memphis Board 
of  Education  Craft  Employees  Association  AFL-CIO,  art.  3  (effective  Jan.  16,  2010) 
[hereinafter Craft Employees Association Contract], available at http://www.mcsk12.net/form
s/CRAFT%20Contract%20%202007%20-%202010.pdf.  The latter memorandum omits the 
word “certified.”  Id. 
151. Memphis-UAW Contract, supra note 150, art. 7; Craft Employees Association 
Contract, supra note 150, art. 7. 
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arbitrator’s decision is truly final and binding despite what the 
agreement provides because the employer may always walk away from 
it with legal impunity.  Enforcement depends on continued positive 
relationships between the parties. 
What lessons might the Tennessee examples offer Wisconsin?  Act 
10 gutted collective bargaining rights in two different ways.  For one 
group of workers, Act 10 exempted them from the state’s employment 
relations acts.152  Although for these employees there is no statutory 
right to organize and bargain collectively, there is also no statutory 
prohibition.  There would appear to be no legal impediment to the 
employer voluntarily recognizing a union designated or selected by a 
majority of employees in one of these groups.  All of these workers, 
however, are employed by the State of Wisconsin.  As long as the 
Governor is hostile to collective bargaining, voluntary recognition will 
not occur.  However, a future Governor more receptive to public 
employee voice could voluntarily recognize employees’ representatives.  
Tennessee authority suggests that such recognition may only be lawful 
where authorized by statute, but the weight of authority from other 
jurisdictions is to the contrary.153  There is a rich history of the extension 
of collective bargaining rights in the absence of statute by gubernatorial 
executive order.154 
The majority of public employees under Act 10 nominally remain 
covered by the state’s public sector collective bargaining statutes, but 
bargaining on all subjects other than base wages is prohibited.155  
Because an employer may legally walk away from any contract 
provision other than base wages, public employers would appear to have 
minimal legal risk in bargaining with the employees’ exclusive 
representative despite the statute.156  The principal risk Wisconsin public 
employers would face would be political.  Opponents of public 
 
152. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
153. See, e.g., Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. and Mun. Emps. v. City of Benton, 513 F.3d 874 
(8th Cir. 2008) (applying Arkansas law); City of Phx. v. Phx. Emp’t  Relations Bd., 699 P.2d 
1323 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985); Littleton Educ. Ass’n v. Arapahoe Cnty. Sch. Dist., 553 P.2d 793 
(Colo. 1976); Chi. Div. of Ill. Educ. Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ., 222 N.E.2d 243 (Ill. App. Ct. 1966); 
La. Teachers Ass’n v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 303 So. 2d 564 (La. Ct. App. 1974). 
154. See MARTIN H. MALIN, ANN C. HODGES & JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBLIC SECTOR 
EMPLOYMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 288–89 (2d ed. 2011). 
155. 2011 Wis. Act 10 §§ 245, 314. 
156. Perhaps the principal legal risk would be that an employee covered by the contract 
who is opposed to representation may file an unfair labor practice charge with the Wisconsin 
Employment Relations Commission. 
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employee collective bargaining could be expected to generate 
considerable political heat for public officials who opt to negotiate 
prohibited subjects.  Act 10 was extremely polarizing politically and the 
polarization remains.  In such a political environment, it is probably 
unrealistic to expect public employers to negotiate prohibited subjects 
of bargaining even though they may walk away from any agreements 
reached at any time. 
B. Members Only Bargaining 
Although Act 10 prohibits collective bargaining with a union serving 
as exclusive representative over anything other than base wages,157 it 
does not prohibit negotiations between public employers and individual 
employees.  Nor would it seem to prohibit negotiations between public 
employers and two or more employees.  Before the Major League 
Baseball Players Association gained the right to collectively bargain for 
major league baseball players, Sandy Koufax and Don Drysdale, the two 
aces of the Los Angeles Dodgers’ pitching staff, held out together and 
were able to negotiate better deals than they could have individually.158 
Koufax and Drysdale apparently were advised by the same attorney 
during their holdout.159  Public employers reluctant to negotiate with an 
exclusive representative on behalf of an entire bargaining unit over 
prohibited subjects of bargaining may be more amenable to negotiating 
with a union serving as a common agent for the union’s members. 
The City of Memphis has several members-only collective 
bargaining relationships.  Although most of the City’s memoranda of 
understanding with IUOE Local 369D recognize the union as exclusive 
representative for bargaining unit employees, the memorandum with 
Local 369D covering heavy equipment operators recognizes the union 
“as the collective bargaining agency of its present members and those 
becoming such in the future individually and collectively.”160  The 
agreement is enforced through a grievance procedure culminating in 
final and binding arbitration.161 
 
157. See 2011 Wis. Act 10 §§ 245, 314. 
158. See Associated Press, Holdout Twins Look Like Money in the Bank in Drills, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 3, 1966, at S1.  
159. Bill Becker, Koufax and Drysdale Agree to One-Year Contracts Totaling Over 
$210,000, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1966, at 47.  
160. IUOE-Memphis Heavy Equipment Operators Contract, supra note 132, art. 1. 
161. Id. art. 11. 
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The memorandum of understanding covering Memphis firefighters 
also appears to be a members-only contract.  The memorandum accords 
the union recognition “as a designated representative for certain 
employees of the Division of Fire” and adds that “[t]he term ‘certain 
employees’ . . . places no limitations or restrictions on the right of an 
employee to belong to and be represented by the Union.”162  As with the 
IUOE memorandum, enforcement is through a grievance procedure 
culminating in binding arbitration.163  Similar recognition provisions are 
found in memoranda of understanding between the City and various 
building trades unions.164  Enforcement is through a grievance procedure 
which culminates in arbitration that, like the AFSCME memoranda, is 
final and binding only with respect to suspensions and discharge and is 
advisory with respect to all other matters.165 
A strong argument can be made that an agreement negotiated by a 
union on behalf of its members only, rather than as exclusive 
 
162. Agreement Between City of Memphis and the International Association of Fire 
Fighters Local 1784, art. 1 (Sept. 22, 2011), available at http://www.cityofmemphis.org/pdf_for
ms/MOU/IAFF.pdf. 
163. Id. art. 8. 
164. Memorandum of Understanding Between City of Memphis and the International 
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 474, art. 1 (Mar. 25, 2011) [hereinafter Memphis-
Electrical Workers Contract], available at http://www.cityofmemphis.org/pdf_forms/MOU/IB
EW.pdf.; Memorandum of Understanding Between City of Memphis and the IUPAT, 
Painters Union Local 49, art. 1 (Mar. 25, 2011) [hereinafter Memphis-IUPAT Contract], 
available at http://www.memphistn.gov/pdf_forms/MOU/Painters_Union.pdf; Memorandum 
of Understanding Between City of Memphis and the Plumbers Union Local 17, art. 1 (Mar. 
25, 2011) [hereinafter Memphis-Plumbers Union Contract], available at http://www.memphist
n.gov/pdf_forms/MOU/Plumbers_Union.pdf;  Memorandum  of  Understanding  Between 
City  of  Memphis  and  the  Roofers  Union  Local  115,  art.  1  (Mar.  25,  2011)  [Memphis-
Roofers Union Contract], available at http://www.cityofmemphis.org/pdf_forms/MOU/Roofer
s_Union.pdf;  Memorandum  of  Understanding  Between  City  of  Memphis  and  the 
Cement  Masons  Union  Local  908,  art.  1  (effective  July  1,  2011)  [hereinafter  Memphis-
Cement Masons Union Contract], available at http://www.cityofmemphis.org/pdf_forms/MO
U/Cement_Masons_Union.pdf; Memorandum of Understanding Between City of Memphis 
and the  Carpenters  Union  Local  345,  art.  1  (effective  July  1,  2011)  [hereinafter 
Memphis-Carpenters Union Contract], available at http://www.cityofmemphis.org/pdf_forms/
MOU/Carpenters_Union.pdf; Memorandum of Understanding Between City of Memphis 
and the Bricklayers Union Local 5, art. 1 (Mar. 25, 2011) [hereinafter 
Memphis-Bricklayers Union Contract], available at http://www.cityofmemphis.org/pdf_forms/
MOU/Bricklayers_Union.pdf. 
165. Memphis-Electrical Workers Contract, supra note 164, art. 18; Memphis-IUPAT 
Contract, supra note 164, art. 18; Memphis-Plumbers Union Contract, supra note 164, art. 18; 
Memphis-Roofers Union Contract, supra note 164, art. 18; Memphis-Cement Masons Union 
Contract, supra note 164, art. 18; Memphis-Carpenters Union Contract, supra 164, art. 18; 
Memphis-Bricklayer’s Union Contract, supra note 164, art. 18. 
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representative for all employees in a bargaining unit, would be 
enforceable.  The argument would be even stronger if the agreement is 
implemented with a series of identical individual contracts with each 
member employee.166  Members-only negotiations might also shield 
public officials from some of the political risk they would run if they 
negotiate with a union as exclusive bargaining representative with 
respect to prohibited subjects of bargaining. 
C. Negotiated Frameworks for Union Representation 
Under the First Amendment, public employees’ freedom of speech 
and association protects their right to form and join labor unions.167  
That is where First Amendment protection for public employees’ union 
organizing activity starts and ends.  Employees have no First 
Amendment right to union representation, even as individuals resorting 
to their employers’ unilaterally promulgated internal grievance 
procedure.168 
Perhaps recognizing the limitations of constitutional law as a source 
of representational rights, SEIU Local 205 has negotiated memoranda 
of understanding with local governmental authorities in Nashville and 
Davidson County that provide what I will call a framework for union 
representation of employees.169  For example, the memorandum of 
understanding between Local 205 and the Government of Metropolitan 
Nashville provides for recognition of the union as the “exclusive 
authorized Representative . . . of all Civil Service General Government 
employees,” but further declares that “the purpose of this MOU is to 
allow the UNION to represent all employees who desire to be 
 
166. The case for the legality of members-only contracts is not an open-and-shut one.  
Because Wisconsin law prohibits employers from discriminating to encourage membership in 
a labor organization, employers may feel compelled to extend the terms of members-only 
contracts unilaterally to other employees in the bargaining unit.  This may fuel an argument 
that the claim that members-only bargaining is consistent with Act 10’s prohibitions elevates 
form over substance. 
167. See, e.g., Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., and Mun. Emps. v. Woodward, 406 F.2d 137, 
139 (8th Cir. 1969); Atkins v. City of Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. 1068, 1077 (W.D.N.C. 1969). 
168. See Smith v. Ark. State Highway Emps., Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463, 465 (1979). 
169. See generally Memorandum of Understanding Between Tennessee Healthcare and 
Public Service Workers Union, Service Employees International Union, Local 205 and 
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (effective July 1, 2012) 
[hereinafter SEIU-Nashville Contract], available at http://www.seiu205.org/admin/Assets/Ass
etContent/ea195743-16b7-4754-a0be-31445ef2a83d/546bfa9e-94e2-495f-9d30-54cc81f55e47/7c
eaa87d-463f-4c94-9ab2-34f4f2fbde15/1/Metro_MOU_-_2012-2014.pdf. 
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represented in the above-described represented unit.”170  The 
memorandum does not establish substantive terms and conditions of 
employment.171  It adopts by reference the Nashville Civil Service Rules 
and Pay Plan.172  Employees have a right to be represented by the union 
in Civil Service proceedings provided that they authorize such 
representation in writing.173  The memorandum essentially establishes 
the infrastructure for such representation by providing for the 
recognition of stewards, release time for employees performing 
representational functions, union access to employer facilities and 
bulletin boards, voluntary payment of union dues by payroll deduction, 
and a right to meet and confer regarding changes in employer policies 
with respect to terms and conditions of employment and the pay plan.174  
The model is followed in memoranda of understanding that Local 205 
has with the Metropolitan Action Commission of Nashville and 
Davidson County, the Hospital Authority of the Metropolitan 
Government of Nashville and Davidson County, and the Metropolitan 
Housing and Development Authority.175  These memoranda provide a 
model that public employers and unions in Wisconsin may adopt to 
facilitate union representation of employees who desire it.  They may 
ensure that employees who are union members may be represented by 
their unions in investigatory interviews and in employer internal 
grievance and civil service proceedings.  They may also provide for 
union access to employees at the workplace for purposes of 
representation and union access to information relevant to member 
representation. 
 
170. Id. art. 1. 
171. See SEIU-Nashville Contract, supra note 169. 
172. Id. arts. 8–10, 14. 
173. Id. art. 8. 
174. See id. arts. 4–6, 11, 13, 16. 
175. Proposed Memorandum of Understanding Between Service Employees 
International Union and Metropolitan Action Commission of Nashville and Davidson 
County (Nov. 2, 2011); Memorandum of Understanding Between Tennessee Healthcare and 
Public Service Workers Union, Service Employees International Union, Local 205 and the 
Hospital Authority of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County 
(effective July 1, 2008–June 30, 2011) [hereinafter SEIU-Nashville Hospital Contract]; 
Memorandum of Understanding Between Tennessee Healthcare and Public Service Workers 
Union, Service Employees International Union, Local 205 and Metropolitan Development 
and Housing Agency (effective Oct. 1, 2001) [hereinafter SEIU-MDHA Contract], available 
at http://seiu205.org/Assets/AssetContent//ea195743-16b7-4754-a0be-31445ef2a83d/546bfa9e-
94e2-495f-9d30-54cc81f55e47/e1916551-173b-40dc-a0c6-1b98da71f551/1/MDHA.pdf. 
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D.  Meet and Confer and Consultation 
Employers looking for a structure to ensure positive employee input 
in workplace decision-making after Act 10 have looked to provide for 
meet and confer sessions with employees’ unions.  For example, 
Milwaukee requires its Department of Employee Relations to “[m]eet 
and confer with employees and employee groups, including currently 
and previously-certified employee groups, for the purpose of 
communicating, soliciting and exchanging information, views, ideas and 
interests concerning wages, hours, and other conditions of 
employment.”176  Established examples exist of what a meet and confer 
or consultation system might look like. 
Minnesota requires its public employers to meet and confer with 
representatives of their professional employees with respect to matters 
relating to public services that are not mandatory subjects of bargaining.  
Such meet and confer sessions must take place at least once every four 
months.177  The statute defines meet and confer as “the exchange of 
views and concerns between employers and their employees.”178 
Greater structure for such employee input in employer decision-
making is found in the Federal Service Labor Management Relations 
Statute.  The statute provides that in agencies where no union has 
exclusive recognition on an agency-wide basis, unions that are exclusive 
representatives of a substantial number of agency employees are 
entitled to national consultation rights.179  National consultation rights 
include rights to be informed of any proposed substantive changes in 
conditions of employment, to be permitted reasonable time to present 
views and recommendations, to have views considered before the 
agency takes final action, and to receive a written statement of reasons 
for the final action.180 
For meet and confer to be more than mere window dressing, several 
elements should be present.  Most importantly, there should be notice to 
the employees’ representative and an opportunity for involvement 
before a decision is made.  There should also be a sharing of relevant 
information concerning the matters under discussion.  Employers should 
 
176. MILWAUKEE, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 340-3(2)(a) (2011), available at 
http://city.milwaukee.gov/ImageLibrary/Groups/ccClerk/Ordinances/Volume-3/CH340.pdf. 
177. MINN. STAT. ANN § 179A.08(2) (2006). 
178. Id. § 179A.03–(10). 
179. 5 U.S.C. § 7113(a) (2006). 
180. Id. § 7113(b). 
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consider the union’s representations in good faith and should respond to 
them by, at a minimum, indicating how those representations were 
considered and, if they were rejected, the reasons for the rejection. 
E. Collaborative Conferencing 
In 2011, Tennessee repealed its statute which granted teachers 
collective bargaining rights and replaced it with the Professional 
Educators Collaborative Conferencing Act.181  The Act provides an 
intriguing model for employers and employees seeking to provide for 
employee representation in a system that operates outside the confines 
of Act 10.  The Act replaces exclusive representation with proportional 
representation, with each representation option that receives at least 
15% of the vote getting a seat at the table.182  The collaborative 
conferencing committee remains in effect for three years after which the 
election process is repeated.183 
The Act defines collaborative conferencing as “the process by which 
[the parties] . . . meet at reasonable times to confer, consult and discuss 
and to exchange information, opinions and proposals on matters relating 
to the terms and conditions of professional employee service, using the 
principles and techniques of interest-based collaborative problem-
solving.”184  Because collaborative conferencing is not collective 
bargaining, Act 10’s prohibition on bargaining should not apply.  But, 
Wisconsin parties attracted to this approach should not copy the 
Tennessee statute wholesale.  The Tennessee act contains provisions 
that are likely to poison, rather than facilitate, a positive and 
collaborative atmosphere.  These include a provision authorizing the 
director of schools to bypass the employees’ representatives and deal 
directly with individual employees,185 and a provision prohibiting 
conferences with respect to a lengthy lists of subjects including 
differential pay plans and incentive compensation, expenditure of grants 
or awards, evaluations, staffing decisions, personnel decisions 
concerning assignment of professional employees, and payroll 
deductions for political activities.186 
 
181. 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts 378. 
182. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-5-605(b)(4) (Supp. 2012). 
183. Id. § 49-5-605(b)(6)(A). 
184. Id. § 49-5-602(2). 
185. Id. § 49-5-608(c). 
186. Id. § 49-5-608(b). 
12 MALIN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/6/2013  9:30 PM 
656 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [96:623 
F. Union Financial Viability 
None of the alternatives to Act 10 for vehicles for collective worker 
voice will be effective if the workers’ representative is not financially 
viable.  As discussed previously, Act 10 dealt a potentially devastating 
blow to union financial viability by prohibiting voluntary payment of 
dues by payroll deduction.187  The U.S. District Court decision holding 
the prohibition unconstitutional removes an enormous roadblock to 
union financial viability.188  But, even if the Seventh Circuit affirms the 
decision, the litigation will only remove the prohibition of employer 
deduction of dues from employees’ paychecks.  Employers must still 
agree to make such deductions.189 
Wisconsin employers, once freed from Act 10’s prohibition, have 
every reason to agree to allow employees to voluntarily authorize 
payroll deductions to pay their union dues.  Financially-viable unions 
are critical to constructive independent collective employee voice in 
workplace decision-making, and employee voice contributes to 
improvements in public services.  Indeed, every memorandum of 
understanding in Tennessee examined for this Article expressly 
provides for employees to pay their union dues by payroll deduction. 
But dues check-off goes only so far in ensuring union financial 
viability.  Under Act 10, Wisconsin, except for public safety employees, 
is now an open shop and it is likely that many employees will opt to 
avoid the cost of union dues altogether.  Models exist, however, for 
ameliorating the effects of such free riding. 
The federal government is also an open shop.  The Federal Service 
Labor Management Relations Statute affords union representatives a 
right to use “official time” when engaged in collective bargaining 
 
187. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
188. See supra notes 23–31 and accompanying text.  
189. In the federal litigation, the unions have argued that the State of Wisconsin is 
required to reinstitute dues check-off for all state employees who authorize it.  See Reply 
Brief in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 18, Wis. Educ. Ass’n Council 
v. Walker, 824 F. Supp. 2d 856 (W.D. Wis. 2012).  The unions argue that pre-Act 10 state law 
provided for dues check-off for all employee organizations regardless of whether they were 
exclusive bargaining representatives.  See id. at 17; Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. 
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985) (holding limitation on participation in the Combined 
Federal Campaign to not-for-profit organizations that provide direct health and welfare 
services to needy persons is facially valid but allowing excluded legal defense funds an 
opportunity on remand to establish that their exclusions were based on the viewpoints they 
advocate). 
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negotiations.190  In other words, such union representatives have a right 
to be released from their regular duties but continue in paid status when 
engaged in collective bargaining.  Unions and agencies frequently agree 
in collective bargaining to supplement the statutory entitlement with 
additional official time for the performance of other representational 
duties.191  Similarly, the SEIU memoranda of understanding with 
governmental authorities in Nashville provide for blocks of paid release 
time for employees performing representational functions.192  Every 
memorandum of understanding in Tennessee examined for this Article 
provides for union representatives to be released from their regular 
duties to investigate and present grievances without loss of pay.  
Similarly, Wisconsin public employers should consider allowing union 
representatives to perform some representational functions “on the 
clock.” 
V. A SILVER LINING IN THE GRAY CLOUD OF ACT 10 
As far back as 1989, a Labor Department report identified legal 
doctrine concerning the scope of bargaining as a barrier to labor-
management cooperation in the public sector.193  Seven years later, a 
Secretary of Labor task force elaborated on how disputes over the scope 
of bargaining inhibit constructive labor-management efforts to improve 
public services: 
Because it affects the capacity of an agency or jurisdiction to 
improve service, the clearest need is for workers, managers, and 
union leaders to be able to discuss the full range of issues 
affecting the service they are working to improve.  In a 
traditional labor-management relationship characterized by 
formal or legalistic approaches, such discussion often is 
precluded by concerns over setting precedents that might lead to 
giving up prerogatives.194 
 
190. 5 U.S.C. § 7131(a) (2006). 
191. See generally id. § 7131(d); Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. Fed. Labor 
Relations Auth., 464 U.S. 89, 90–91 (1983). 
192. See SEIU-Nashville Contract, supra note 169, art. 11; SEIU-Nashville Hospitals 
Contract, supra note 175, art. 17; SEIU-MDHA Contract, supra note 175, art. 21. 
193. Robert B. Moberly, Legal Impediments to Labor-Management Cooperation in State 
and Local Government, in U.S. LABOR LAW AND THE FUTURE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT 
COOPERATION: FINAL REPORT 1, 19–22 (1989). 
194. WORKING TOGETHER FOR PUBLIC SERVICE, supra note 95, at 65. 
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Act 10 preempted such fights in Wisconsin by declaring everything 
other than base wages to be prohibited subjects of bargaining.195  Act 10 
thus forces employers and employee representatives to work outside the 
established legal structure to devise mechanisms for independent 
positive collective employee voice.  This Article has provided a range of 
alternatives for Wisconsin public employers and unions to consider.  
Each of these models depends on positive relationships between 
workers’ unions and their employers.  However, the opposition of many 
public employers to Act 10196 indicates that many such positive 
relationships already exist.  Further indication of such positive 
relationships can be found in the numerous employers who agreed to 
new collective bargaining agreements or to extend existing contracts 
before Act 10 took effect to delay the application of Act 10 to their 
workplaces.197 
For Wisconsin public employers to retain the benefits of 
independent collective employee voice, they and their workers’ unions 
have to work outside the existing legal structures.  Such a move outside 
the post-Act 10 legal framework can be liberating.  As Professor Hodges 
has observed, when parties move outside a legal structure that focuses 
on whether a matter is a mandatory subject of bargaining, resulting 
agreements “can be virtually unlimited in their scope.”198  The challenge 
for Wisconsin public employers and unions is to devise their own models 
for effective independent worker voice and demonstrate that Governor 
Walker is wrong—that labor-management collaboration is a superior 
method to unilateral command and control for providing effective and 
efficient public services. 
 
 
195. See 2011 Wis. Act 10 § 245. 
196. See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.  
197. Editorial, A Triple Play on Local Taxpayers, WIS. ST. J., Sept. 27, 2012, at A13. 
198. Hodges & Warwick, supra note 102, at 285. 
